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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Raymond Scott Peck (herein after Peck) appeals form the Dsitrict court's decision 
upon judicial review affirming the order of the Idaho Transporation Department 
(hereinafter ITD) suspending Peck's driver's license after Burton's failure of an 
evidentiary test and arrest for DUI. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
ITD agrees with the "Course of Proceedings" as described in the brief filed by the 
Appellant. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 2, 2009, Peck was arrested for Driving Under the Influence (DUI) 
by Sandpoint Police Officer Nolan Crossley in Bonner County, Idaho. Officer Crossley 
was conducting stationary speed enforcement on Highway 95 across from the North Info 
Center. Agency Record, page 6. He observed a vehicle traveling 45 mph in a 35 mph 
posted speed zone. Officer Crossley activated his overhead lights and stopped the 
vehicle. Id. He contacted the driver, who was identified as Raymond Peck, Jr. Id The 
officer detected an odor of alcohol. Id Peck refused to perform field sobriety tests. Peck 
was arrested and transported to the Sandpoint Police Department. Peck was then given 
an evidentiary breath test and Peck's results were .089/xx/.083/.086. Id Officer 
Schneider served Peck with a Notice of Suspension and issued a permit for temporary 
driving privileges. See Agency Record, page 1-2. 
Peck requested an administrative hearing on the proposed license suspens10n. 
The administrative hearing was held on December 29, 2009 before Hearing Officer Eric 
Moody. See Hearing Transcript. During the hearing, Peck testified and the officer did 
not. Id 
On January 8, 2010, the hearing officer issued his decision which sustained the 
ninety (90) day license suspension. See Agency Record, pages 39-57. In summary, the 
hearing officer found: 
(1) Officer Crossley had legal cause to approach Peck's vehicle; 
Id 
(2) Officer Crossley had legal cause to believe Peck had violated Idaho Code 
Section 18-8004; 
(3) That the evidentiary tests indicated that Peck was in violation of Idaho Code 
Section 18-8004; 
(4) That the evidentiary tests were performed in compliance with all requirements 
set forth in Idaho Code and ISP Forensic Services Standard Operating 
Procedures; 
(5) That the evidentiary testing instrument functioned properly when the test was 
administered; 
(6) That Peck was advised of the possible suspension of his Idaho Driver's 
privileges; and 
(7) That Peck was not required to be informed of the CDL disqualification at the 
time of his arrest, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8002(3) and l 8-
8002A(2). 
On January 14, 20 I 0, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review. See 
Agency Record, page 50-54. On January 15, 2010, Honorable Judge Steve Yerby issued 
an Order Staying the driver's license suspension pending this appeal. 
Petitioner also writes that Peck's speeding ticket was dismissed and his DUI 
charge was resolved by a guilty plea and withheld judgment to an amended charge of 
inattentive driving. This evidence is not part of the record on this appeal and not relevant 
to this appeal. Judicial review of the hearing officer's decision is generally confined to 
the record unless the party requesting the additional evidence can demonstrate that the 
evidence falls within the statutory exceptions provided for in Idaho Code Section 67-
5276. None of the exceptions apply herein. 
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the Notice of Hearing issued by the hearing officer inadequate such 
that the suspension should be vacated? 
2. Was the Notice of Suspension inadequate because it failed to advise 
Petitioner of the requirements of Idaho Code Section 49-335(2)? 
2 
3. Are the documents used to support the suspension inadequate because they 
fail to identify the alleged acts as occurring in Idaho? 
4. Did the officer have probable cause to stop Peck? 
5. Were the BAC tests done properly? 
6. Is Petitioner entitled to attorney fees? 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The administrative license suspension (ALS) statute, I.C. § 18-8002A, requires 
that the ITD suspend the driver's license of a driver who has failed a BAC test 
administered by a law enforcement officer. Bennett v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 147 Idaho 
141, 206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009). The period of suspension is ninety days for a 
driver's first failure of an evidentiary test and one year for any subsequent test failure 
within five years. I.C. § l 8-8002A( 4)(a). A person who has been notified of an ALS may 
request a hearing before a hearing officer designated by the ITD to contest the 
suspension. I.C. § 18-8002A(7). At the administrative hearing, the burden of proof rests 
upon the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the suspension. I.C. § l 8-8002A(7); 
Kane v. State, Dep't ofTransp., 139 Idaho 586, 590, 83 P.3d 130, 134 (Ct.App.2003). 
The hearing officer must uphold the suspension unless he or she finds, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown one of several grounds 
enumerated in I.C. § l 8-8002A(7) for vacating the suspension. Those grounds include: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or 
was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-
8004, l 8-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
( c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs 
or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-
8006, Idaho Code; or 
( d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances 
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4), Idaho Code, or the 
testing equipment was not functioning properly when the test was administered; 
or 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary 
testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
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LC.§ 18-8002A(7). The hearing officer's decision is subject to challenge through a 
petition for judicial review. LC. § 18-8002A(8); Kane, 139 Idaho at 589, 83 P.3d at 133. 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (LD.A.P.A.) governs the review of 
department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's 
driver's license. See LC. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. Recently, in Bennett v. 
State Department of Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505 (Ct App 2009), the 
Court of Appeals restated the necessary standard of review for the Court. The Court 
stated, in pertinent part: 
This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight 
of the evidence presented. LC.§ 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d 
at 669. This Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 
1262, 1265 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, 
the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even 
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the 
determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. 
Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rel. Bd of Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 
742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) 
exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or ( e) are arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the 
agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in 
LC. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. 
Price v. Payette County Bd of County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429, 958 P.2d 
583,586 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. If the agency's 
decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and remanded for 
further proceedings as necessary." LC.§ 67-5279(3). 
Id, at 506-507. Therefore, in an ALS appeal the burden is on the Petitioner to establish 
that ITD erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3), and then to 
establish that a substantial right has been prejudiced. 
B.ARGUMENT 
1. ADEQUATE HEARING NOTICE 
Petitioner contended that his notice of the ALS hearing was not adequate and 
required that his driver's license suspension be vacated. This argument is without merit. 
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The Agency Record revealed the following: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
December 8, 2009 a letter was sent from attorney John Finney requesting 
a hearing on the ALS suspension. The letter was sent via fax, therefore it 
was assumed that it was received by ITD on December 8, 2009. Agency 
Record, page 12-13. 
December 15, 2009 a letter was sent from ITD with a Show Cause Letter 
with notice that the hearing date was extended due to a conflict in the 
hearing examiner's schedule. Agency Record, page 21. 
December 15, 2009 a letter was sent from ITD with Notice of Telephonic 
Hearing to be held on December 29, 2009 with Hearing Officer Mark 
Richmond at 11 :00MT. Agency Record, page 20. 
December 18, 2009 a letter was sent from ITD with Notice of Telephonic 
Hearing to be held on December 9, 2009 with Hearing Officer Eric 
Moody at 11 :00MT. Agency Record, page 22. 1 
December 18, 2009 a letter was sent from ITD with Show Cause Letter 
stating the hearing date was extended because of a change in the hearing 
officer. Agency Record, page 24. 
6. Ultimately the hearing was held on December 29, 2009 before Hearing 
Officer Eric Moody at 11 :00 MT. Agency Record, page 32 and Transcript, 
page 1. 
Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7) provides in pertinent part: 
(7) Administrative hearing on suspension. A person wo has been served with a 
notice of suspension after submitting to an evidentiary test may request an 
administrative hearing on the suspension before a hearing officer designated by 
the department. The request for hearing shall be in writing and must be received 
by the department within seven (7) calendar days of the date of service upon the 
person of the notice of suspension, and shall include what issue or issues shall be 
raised at the hearing. The date on which the hearing request was received shall be 
noted on the face of the request. 
If a hearing is requested, the hearing shall be held within twenty (20) days of 
the date the hearing request was received by the department unless this 
1 Interestingly, this Notice must contain a typographical error since the Notice contains a hearing date of 
December 9th, that precedes the date of the letter (December 18th). This Notice probably should have read 
December 29th, not December 9th • 
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period is, for good cause shown, extended by the hearing officer for one ten 
(10) day period. Such extension shall not operate as a stay of the suspension and 
any temporary permit shall expire thirty (30) days after service of the notice of 
suspension, notwithstanding an extension of the hearing date beyond such thirty 
(30) day period. Written notice of the date and time of the hearing shall be sent to 
the party requesting the hearing at least seven (7) days prior to the scheduled 
hearing date. The department may conduct all hearings by telephone if each 
participant in the hearing has an opportunity to participate in the entire proceeding 
while it is taking place. [ emphasis added]. 
Here, the hearing was held on December 29, 2009. This hearing date was within 
the time allowable by the statute (twenty days plus an extension by the hearing officer). 
There also was apparently no confusion on the part of the Peck regarding the date of the 
hearing. Judge Yerby addressed this issue and wrote 
In this case, the hearing was held on December 29, 2009. Mr. Peck was 
represented at the hearing by his attorney, John Finney. Simply stated, the listing 
of an already passed date as being the date of the hearing did not affect any 
"substantial right" of Mr. Peck, as he did attend the hearing and the issues he 
raised were addressed. 
R., p. 72. Therefore, no substantial right of the Petitioner was violated. As such, this 
argument was properly rejected by the District Court. 
2. THE NOTICE OF SUPSENSION PROVIDES ADEQUATE NOTICE 
Peck argued that the Notice of Suspension was not adequate because it failed to 
inform him of the provisions and consequences of Idaho Code Section 49-335(2). Peck 
did not argue that he did not receive the admonitions required by Idaho Code Sections 
18-8002 and l 8-8002A. Instead, he invitee the Court to add language to those code 
sections by including other consequences to the Suspension Advisory form. The District 
Court correctly declined the invitation. 
The hearing officer concluded that the notice given to Peck complied with Idaho 
law and found: 
1. Peck was read the Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 and l 8-8002A advisory 
form prior to submitting to the evidentiary test. 
2. Idaho Code Sections 18-8002(3) l 8-8002A(2) does not mandate a driver 
be informed of the consequences noted in Idaho Code section 18-8004, 
6 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
3. 
l 8-8004(c) and 18-8006 prior to a driver submitting, failing to complete, 
or refusing an evidentiary test. 
Peck was advised of the consequences of refusing or failing evidentiary 
testing pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 and l 8-8002A. 
Agency Record, page 52. The hearing officer's conclusion on this issue was correct. 
Idaho law sets forth the requirements for the notice provided to drivers before 
taking the evidentiary breath test. Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(2) states in pertinent 
part: 
(2) Information to be given. At the time of evidentiary testing for concentration of 
alcohol, or for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested, 
the person shall be informed that if the person refuses to submit to or fails to 
complete evidentiary testing, or if the person submits to and completes 
evidentiary testing and the test results indicate an alcohol concentration or the 
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 
l 8-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code, the person shall be informed substantially as 
follows (but need not be informed verbatim): 
If you refuse to submit to or if you fail to complete and pass evidentiary testing 
for alcohol or other intoxicating substances: 
(a) The peace officer will seize your driver's license and issue a notice of 
suspension and a temporary driving permit to you, but no peace officer will issue 
you a temporary driving permit if your driver's license or permit has already been 
and is suspended or revoked. No peace officer shall issue a temporary driving 
permit to a driver of a commercial vehicle who refuses to submit to or fails to 
complete and pass an evidentiary test; 
(b) You have the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days of the notice of 
suspension of your driver's license to show cause why you refused to submit to or 
to complete and pass evidentiary testing and why your driver's license should not 
be suspended; 
( c) If you refused or failed to complete evidentiary testing and do not request a 
hearing before the court or do not prevail at the hearing, your driver's license will 
be suspended. The suspension will be for one (1) year if this is your first refusal. 
The suspension will be for two (2) years if this is your second refusal within ten 
(10) years. You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license during 
that period; 
( d) If you complete evidentiary testing and fail the testing and do not request a 
hearing before the department or do not prevail at the hearing, your driver's 
7 
license will be suspended. This suspension will be for ninety (90) days if this is 
your first failure of evidentiary testing, but you may request restricted 
noncommercial vehicle driving privileges after the first thirty (30) days. The 
suspension will be for one (1) year if this is your second failure of evidentiary 
testing within five (5) years. You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted 
license during that period; 
(e) If you become enrolled in and are a participant in good standing in a drug 
court approved by the supreme court drug court and mental health court 
coordinating committee under the provisions of chapter 56, title 19, Idaho Code, 
you shall be eligible for restricted noncommercial driving privileges for the 
purpose of getting to and from work, school or an alcohol treatment program, 
which may be granted by the presiding judge of the drug court, provided that you 
have served a period of absolute suspension of driving privileges of at least forty-
five ( 45) days, that an ignition interlock device is installed on each of the motor 
vehicles owned or operated, or both, by you and that you have shown proof of 
financial responsibility; and 
(f) After submitting to evidentiary testing you may, when practicable, at your own 
expense, have additional tests made by a person of your own choosing. 
On December 3, 2009 Peck was served with a "Suspension Advisory" provided in 
pertinent part: 
3. If you take and fail the evidentiary test( s) pursuant to Section 18-8002, 
Idaho Code: 
A. Your Idaho driver's license ... will be seized if you have it in your 
possession, and if it is current you will be issued a temporary permit. .. .If you 
were driving a commercial vehicle, any temporary permit issued will not provide 
commercial driving privileges of any kind. 
B. I will serve you with this NOTICE OF SUSPENSION that becomes 
effective thirty days from the date of service on this NOTICE, suspending your 
driver's license or privileges .... You may request restricted privileges for the 
remaining 60 days of the suspension. Restricted driving privileges will not allow 
you to operate a commercial motor vehicle .... 
Agency Record, page 1. 
Idaho law does not require that a driver be informed of every single consequence 
of the failure of an evidentiary test. Specifically, Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 and 18-
8002A do not require law enforcement officers to inform drivers of every potential 
consequence of failing the evidentiary test. For example, Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 
8 
and 18-8002A does not require an officer to inform a driver of all potential charges that 
may be filed upon the driver's failure to the evidentiary testing. Although a one year 
suspension of a CDL is another consequence of both the refusal to submit to the testing 
and the failure of the testing, it is not a potential consequence of which a driver must be 
informed at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the failure to inform Peck of the 
consequences to his CDL was not necessary and the Notice of Suspension given to Peck 
complied with Idaho law. Furthermore, Judge Yerby found that "no substantial right of 
Mr. Peck was prejudiced by ... the officer's failure to inform Mr. Peck of the potential 
one-year commercial driver's license suspension." R., p. 73. 
3. THE AFFIDAVIT AND TESTS RESULTS ARE ADEQUATE. 
Peck argues that the evidence submitted by the defective because the documents 
fail to allege that the acts occurred in the State ofldaho. The hearing officer rejected this 
argument finding the Exhibit 4 demonstrated that the alleged acts occurred in Idaho. 
Apparently, Petitioner's argument is that the hearing officer's conclusion that the relevant 
events occurred in Idaho was "not supported by substantial evidence in the record." 
Petitioner's argument is without merit. 
The Probable Cause Affidavit submitted by Officer Crossley contains the 
following heading: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff 
PECK, Raymond S. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
* * * 
State of Idaho, 
County of Bonner 
COURT CASE NUMBER 
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT 
IN SUPPORT OF ARREST 
See Agency Record, page 5. Based upon the evidence in the file, including the above 
Affidavit, the hearing officer had substantial evidence to conclude that the incident at 
9 
issue occurred in Idaho. On this issue, Judge Yerby agreed and stated: "in this case there 
is substantial evidence in the record to conclude that the alleged act occurred in Idaho." 
R., 74. 
4. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE STOP 
One of the grounds by with a hearing officer can vacate the ALS suspension is if 
the hearing officer finds that "the peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the 
person." Peck argues that the hearing officer's finding that there was legal cause for the 
stop was not supported by the evidence. Apparently, Peck's argument is that there 
insufficient proof that the speed limit was 3 5 mph. This argument is without merit. 
The officer testified that there was a posted speed limit of 35 mph. The Probable 
Cause Affidavit submitted by the officer contained the following: 
On December 02, 2009 at approximately 2300 hours, I was parked conducting 
Stationary Speed Enforcement along the southbound shoulder of Highway 95 
across from the North Info Center. I observed a single vehicle traveling 
Southbound towards me that I visually estimated to be doing 45 MPH. As this 
stretch of Highway is posted at 35MPH ... [ emphasis added]. 
Agency Record, page 6. At the hearing, Peck admitted that he was traveling 45 mph 
when he first noticed the officer. Transcript, page 5, lines 10-12. Peck did not refute the 
evidence that there was a posted speed limit of 3 5 mph. See Transcript, page 1-12. 
On the issue of legal cause for the stop, the hearing officer made the following 
findings of fact: 
1. Officer Crossley observed the vehicle driven by Peck travel 45 mph in a 
posted 3 5 mph speed zone. 
2. Since Exhibit 4 specifically states a "posted speed limit" of 35 mph, it is 
assumed this area of highway met the requirements of Idaho Code Section 49-
654(2)( a) and/or (b) even though there were no structures or buildings in the 
area prior to Peck being stopped. 
3. Further in supporting that the posted speed limit was 35 mph, Exhibit 4 
provides Officer Crossley had issued Peck a speeding citation. 
4. Peck's argument regarding the posted speed limit is unsupportive and fails to 
meet his burden of proof. 
10 
5. Officer Crossley had legal cause to stop the vehicle driven by Peck. 
Agency Record, pages 35-36. Certainly, the findings of the hearing officer are supported 
by substantial evidence. 
Peck's argument is that there was insufficient proof that the speed limit was 35 
mph. This argument ignores the undisputed fact that there was a posted speed limit of 
35 mph. The agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even 
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are 
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Bennett v. State, Dept. of 
Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009). 
Peck's argument appears to be that, even if the posted speed limit was 35 mph, 
that evidence does not prove the speed limit because Peck was not in a business district, 
residential district or an urban district. This argument also lacks merit. 
Idaho's basic rule regarding speed limits is contained at Idaho Code Section 49-
654. Section 2 of the statute provides in pertinent part: 
(2) Where no special hazard or condition exists that requires lower speed for 
compliance with subsection (1) of this section the limits as hereinafter authorized 
shall be maximum lawful speeds, and no person shall drive a vehicle at a speed in 
excess of the maximum limits: 
(a) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour or a lesser maximum speed adopted pursuant to 
section 49-207(2)(a), Idaho Code, in any residential, business or urban district; 
[emphasis added], 
(b) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour in any urban district; 
c) Seventy-five (75) miles per hour on interstate highways; 
(d) Sixty-five (65) miles per hour on state highways; 
(e) Fifty-five (55) miles per hour in other locations unless otherwise posted up to 
a maximum of sixty-five (65) miles per hour. 
11 
Idaho Code § 49-207 specifically allows cities to enact and enforce general 
ordinances prescribing additional requirements for the operation of vehicles upon the 
city's highways. State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 167 P.3d 783 (Idaho App. 2006). 
Idaho Code Section 49-207(2) & (3) provides: 
(2) Whenever local authorities in their respective jurisdictions, including the duly 
elected officials of an incorporated city acting in the capacity of a local authority, 
determine on the basis of an engineering or traffic investigation, and the 
residential, urban or business character of the neighborhood abutting the highway 
in a residential, business or urban district that the speed limit permitted under this 
title is greater than is reasonable and safe under the conditions found to exist upon 
a highway or part of a highway or because of the residential, urban or business 
character of the neighborhood abutting the highway in a residential, business or 
urban district, the local authority may determine and declare a reasonable and safe 
maximum limit which: 
(a) Decreases the limit within a residential, business or urban district; or 
(b) Decreases the limit outside an urban district. 
(3) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall determine by an engineering or 
traffic investigation the proper maximum speed not exceeding a maximum limit of sixty-
five (65) miles per hour for all arterial highways and shall declare a reasonable and safe 
maximum limit which may be greater or less than the limit permitted under this title for 
an urban district. 
Residential, business and urban districts are defined. Idaho Code Section 49-
105(11) defines the term "district" as follows: 
(a) Business district. The territory contiguous to and including a highway when 
within any six hundred (600) feet along the highway there are buildings in use for 
business or industrial purposes, including hotels, banks or office buildings, 
railroad stations and public buildings which occupy at least three hundred (300) 
feet of frontage on one side or three hundred (300) feet collectively on both sides 
of the highway. 
(b) Residential district. The territory contiguous to and including a highway not 
comprising a business district when the property on the highway for a distance of 
three hundred (300) feet or more is in the main improved with residences, or 
residences and buildings in use for business. 
(c) Urban district. The territory contiguous to and including any highway which is 
built up with structures devoted to business, industry or dwelling houses. For 
purposes of establishing speed limits in accordance with the provisions of section 
12 
there was competent evidence in the form of the testimony of the department's 
engineer on the sealcoating project that the speed limit was forty-five miles per 
hour, rebutting any speed signs to the contrary. The trial court should have 
instructed the jury that the correct speed limit at the site of the accident was forty-
five miles per hour based on the first brooming. 
Id, at 549. Therefore the holding of Debastani concerned a jury instruction that did not 
conform with the evidence at the trial. 
5. THE BAC TESTS WERE VALID 
Petitioner argued that the BAC tests were invalid because Peck was belching 
during the observation period. Petitioner's argument is without merit. 
The Probable Cause Affidavit from Officer Crossley stated the following: 
PECK was transported to the Sandpoint Police Department, where I began the 15 
minute monitoring period and read him the ALS suspension advisory in its 
entirety, and requested a breath sample which he provided(.089/xxx) after not 
obtaining a second reading, the fifteen minutes of observation was started agin 
(sic). Following the second observation period, PECK again provided a breath 
sample (.083/.086) BrAC. 
Agency Record, page 6 ( emphasis added). Contrary to this, Peck testified during the ALS 
hearing. Peck stated as follows: 
Q: Was then an additional 15-minute waiting period started? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And during that 15-minute waiting period, at any time did you belch? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And did you have your mouth open at the time of the belch? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And did you also pat or I'll describe it as tap on your chest with your fist 
at the time of the belch? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And the officer was present when you did that? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And how much time from the belch until giving what would be the first 
sample of the second set oftests, how much time passed? 
A: Oh, I did it right away. 
Q: Less than one minute before taking the first breath test of the second 
sample? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And no additional 15-minute wait period was started after your belch. Is 
that correct? 
A: No, there was not. 
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Transcript, page 6-7. 
The hearing officer, after reviewing the evidence, disagreed with Peck. In his 
findings, the hearing officer wrote: 
1. Officer Crossley's affidavit states the evidentiary test was performed 
in compliance with Idaho Code and ISP Forensic Services SOPs. 
2. I find it very doubtful that Officer Crossley would have ignored Peck 
tapping his chest, opening his mouth, and then belching prior [to] 
submitting to a breath sample at 00:48 on December 3, 3009. 
3. Exhibit 3's BrAC results support this conclusion in that Peck's two 
subject tests only differed by .003 making the results a valid subject 
tests pursuant to ISP Forensic Services SOP Sections 3.2 and 3.2.3 
requirements. 
4. Further, this agreement noted in Exhibit 3 's BrAC two tests further 
strongly refute the possibility that any mouth alcohol from Peck's 
"alleged" belching had skewed Exhibit 3 results before Peck was 
administered an evidentiary breath test. 
5. Peck's evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Code 
and ISP Forensic Services SOPs. 
Here, the hearing officer was presented with conflicting evidence: the officer's 
statement that he conducted two 15 minute observation periods and Peck's testimony that 
he belched during the observation period. The hearing officer weighed the conflicting 
evidence and concluded that Peck's testimony was not credible. In addition, the hearing 
officer found that the consistency of the BrAC results was further evidence that Peck's 
testimony regarding the "belch" was incredible. 
Petitioner cited Bennett v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 147 Idaho 141,206 P.3d 505 
(Idaho App. 2009), to support his argument that the suspension should be vacated. In 
Bennett, the petitioner challenged the ALS license suspension contending that she was 
coughing during the 15 minute observation period, during which time, the officer twice 
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left the room. The court further found that the evidence that the officer left the room was 
not specifically controverted by the officer's affidavit. The Court of Appeals held: 
Bennett bore the burden to prove grounds to vacate the suspension of her 
license. Bennett testified that the officer left the room twice during the 
fifteen-minute monitoring period. The hearing officer did not find Bennett's 
[206 P.3d 509] testimony to lack credibility. This testimony, then, would 
demonstrate that proper monitoring procedures were not followed, and that the 
test for alcohol concentration was, therefore, not conducted in accordance with 
the requirements of LC.§ 18-8004(4). The State presented only the officer's 
probable cause affidavit. The officer's form affidavit provides only generalized 
statements regarding employment of proper procedures. However, when specific, 
credible evidence demonstrates a violation of proper procedures, the affidavit 
alone is insufficient to support a finding that proper procedures were followed. 
Thus, the hearing officer's finding that the breath test was conducted in 
compliance with procedural standards is not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record as a whole. Therefore, the district court did not err in vacating the 
hearing officer's decision. 
Id., at pages 508-509. 
This case is factually distinguishable from the Bennett case. Here, there was no 
evidence that the officer left the room or that the officer left Peck unattended during the 
15 minute observation period. On the contrary, Peck admits that the officer was present 
in the room when Peck allegedly belched. Transcript, page 6, lines 24-25. 
Furthermore in Bennett, the only evidence regarding compliance by the officer 
with the testing procedures was a computer-generated affidavit which contained a 
paragraph above the officer's signature line that read: "The test(s) was/were performed in 
compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-8004( 4) Idaho Code and the standards and 
methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement." Here, Officer Crossley's 
Affidavit contained specific statements about compliance with two fifteen minute 
observation periods. 
In Bennett case, the hearing officer was presented with unrefuted testimony that 
the officer left the room during the 15 minute observation period. Here, the hearing 
officer's was presented with conflicting evidence. Therefore, his role was to weigh 
conflicting evidence. Evaluating disputed evidence, the hearing officer made a factual 
determination that Peck's testimony was not credible and discounted Peck's testimony 
regarding the alleged belch. This finding is based upon substantial and competent 
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evidence and is therefore binding on the reviewing court.2 Judge Yerby addressed this 
issue and held: 
Although the affidavit is contradictory and there was conflicting evidence 
regarding the belch, the hearing officer weighed the evidence and found the 
officer's testimony to be more credible. The hearing officer's evaluation of the 
parties' credibility, and his conclusion that Mr. Peck's testimony concerning the 
belch should not be accepted, could have been based in part on the similarly of the 
breath test result. It would be inappropriate for a reviewing court to second guess 
the hearing officer's findings of fact of these circumstances. The agency's 
findings must be upheld as they are not clearly erroneous and are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. 
R., p. 74-75. 
6. ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST ITD ARE NOT JUSTIFIED. 
Petitioner is also requesting an award of attorney fees on this appeal. This 
argument is also without merit. Idaho Code Section 12-117(1) provides for an award of 
attorney fees only if certain conditions are met. The statute provides: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial 
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other 
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the 
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
Therefore, to award attorney fees under this section, the Court must rule in favor 
of Peck and also find that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
See, Canal/Norcrest/Columbus Action Comm. v. City of Boise, 136 Idaho 666, 671, 39 
P.3d 606, 611 (2001). 
In this matter, as discussed above, there was a reasonable basis in law and in the 
facts upon which the hearing officer made his decision. Therefore, since neither 
requirement of the statute has been met, the court must decline to award attorney fees. 
2The agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting 
evidence before the agency, so long as the detenninations are supported by substantial competent evidence 
in the record. Bennett v. State, Dept. of Transp., 14 7 Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009). 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, ITD respectfully requests this Court to affirm the 
decision of the hearing officer and the District Court, vacate the driver's license stay and 
uphold the suspension of Peck's driver's license. 
Dated this 0 day of September 2011. 
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